Optimal Criminal Behavior and the Disutility of Jail: Theory and Evidence On Bank Robberies by Giovanni Mastrobuoni
Optimal Criminal Behavior and the Disutility of





© 2011 by Giovanni Mastrobuoni.Any opinions expressed here are those of the authors and not those
of the Collegio CarloAlberto.Optimal Criminal Behavior and the Disutility of Jail:
Theory and Evidence On Bank Robberies∗
Giovanni Mastrobuoni†
First version March 2009, this version November 2011‡
Abstract
Based on unique data on individual bank robberies perpetrated in Italy between
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1 Introduction
This paper uses unique data on individual Italian bank robberies organized between 2005
and 2007 to identify criminals’ individual disutility of jail. The identiﬁcation rests on a
model of crime where the criminal, after selecting a bank, a weapon, a masquerade, and
a team, chooses the optimal duration of the robbery. In line with the opening quote from
Robert Craig’s ﬁction “The Two Minute Rule,” bank robbers choose the optimal duration
of the bank robbery given the expected beneﬁts (more loot) and expected costs (more
risk) of staying an additional minute inside the bank. The model’s ﬁrst order conditions
are used to solve for the only unobserved variable: the disutility of jail time.
Since the disutility of jail depends on the expected sentence length–a longer jail time
leads to larger losses in utility– this paper identiﬁes the individual responsiveness to
sentencing.1 Results show that the distribution of disutility of jail time is positively
skewed and resembles an earnings distribution. This heterogeneity in the criminals’ “fear
of jail” might depend on how much they discount the future (DiIulio, 1996), but is also
likely to depend on their opportunity cost of spending jail time. Changes in the disutility
of jail are predicted to lead to signiﬁcant changes in criminal behavior, and these changes
are larger among criminals with a higher opportunity cost of spending jail time. These
more “able” criminals are the ones that during robberies are masqueraded, use ﬁrearms,
and work in groups. Interestingly, these are the same modi operandi (modes of operation)
that lead to statutory sentence enhancements. I’ll show that Italian judges do not follow
these prescriptions close enough. Only the use of ﬁrearms leads to signiﬁcant sentence
enhancements.
Apart from reconciling statutory and actual sentence enhancements, harshening the
rather mild sanctions (the average sentence for a bank robbery is 3.3 years in Italy while
its 11.4 years in the US) would be another way to reduce Italy’s dramatic number of bank
robberies, especially the more proﬁtable ones. Moreover, I show that the harshening
would ﬁrst drive the most able oﬀenders out of the bank robbery business.
1The disutility might also be used to evaluate more comprehensively the cost and beneﬁts of var-
ious aspects of the criminal justice system, for example it is part of the social cost of incarceration
(Barbarino and Mastrobuoni, 2008).
2This ﬁnding that more “able” criminals respond more strongly to general deterrence
might explain why in the US, where jail sentences for robbing a bank are on average
400 percent higher the pool of robbers is considered to be more amateurish than in Italy
(Weisel, 2007).
These results are robust to the inclusion of unobserved ability or, equivalently, hetero-
geneity in expectations with respect to, both, the haul and the risk, and to the inclusion
of measurement error in the duration of the bank robberies. The results also show that
large degrees of risk aversion (log utility) are clearly rejected by the data. Interestingly,
there are no empirical studies that I am aware of that use observational data to try to
estimate the criminals’ degree of risk aversion.
There is only one other paper, Abrams and Rohlfs (2010), that estimates the average
disutility of jail, which the authors call the Value of Freedom. Based on data on posting
bails the authors’ estimate is around $4,000 per year; they explain this low ﬁgure by
saying that “(t)his seemingly low estimate may result in part because they pertain to
a particularly poor segment of the population. Credit constraints may also aﬀect the
estimate.” This paper goes beyond estimating the average disutility of jail, backing out,
under some parametric assumptions, its distribution.
This paper is also related to the vast amount of papers that have tried to ﬁnd evidence
of deterrence. A rational model of crime predicts that criminals commit an additional
crime whenever the expected marginal utility that they derive from the crime is larger
than the expected marginal sanction (Becker, 1968, Ehrlich, 1973, Freeman, 1999). In its
simplest version individuals gain from successful crimes with some probability 1 − p and
risk being apprehended and spending S years in jail with probability p. The individual
commits a crime whenever the marginal beneﬁts outweigh the marginal costs. Even
though this model is simple and intuitive it has been diﬃcult to estimate. Data are
typically aggregated across space and time, which makes it diﬃcult to measure legal and
illegal earnings (Vicusi, 1986b). Measurement errors have plagued the measurement of
expected beneﬁts and simultaneity issues (policy makers increase police enforcement and
the severity of sanctions when crime levels are high) have made the estimation of the
deterrence eﬀect of the probability of apprehension p diﬃcult. The disutility of jail U(S),
which can also be interpreted as the opportunity cost of jail, is not observed and makes the
estimation still more challenging. Moreover, extensions of the model that would increase
its realism–such as additional allocations of time, the eﬀect of crime or apprehension in
one period on future legitimate and criminal earnings, the risk that a criminal is victimized
by other criminals, and the degree of social stigma associated with crime–complicate the
3estimation even further.
Some studies have tried to ﬁnd evidence on deterrence using individual level data
on perceived deterrence but such data is usually based on prison surveys (Polich et al.,
1980) or on other self-reported crime data (Grogger, 1998, Glaeser and Sacerdote, 1999).2
In both, surveys and self-reports, crime activities might be subject to untruthful re-
porting or at least to underreporting (Vicusi, 1986a). Kessler and Levitt (1999) use the
introduction of sentence enhancement while Helland and Tabarrok (2007) use a quasi-
randomization of sentence enhancements to isolate deterrence and ﬁnd strong evidence of
it. Lee and McCrary (2005), instead, ﬁnd very little evidence of deterrence among juve-
nile criminals who move to the adult sanctioning system: their criminal behavior changes
very little upon turning 18. Drago et al. (2009) use an Italian quasi-experimental setting
and ﬁnd evidence of deterrence. All these studies estimate average deterrence eﬀects.
This paper goes a step further, identifying individual responsiveness to sanctions.
In spirit this paper is also related to the vast literature that tries to estimate the value
of life based on trade oﬀs between fatality risk and diﬀerent kinds of returns, for example
wage premia in the labor market (Thaler and Rosen, 1976, Viscusi, 1993), or the saving
of time when driving (Ashenfelter and Greenstone, 2004).
Section 2 describes the data. A unique feature of the data is that it tells us many
minutes the robbery lasted. The duration represents the robbers’ control variable in the
model outlined in Section 3, which is later estimated in Section4.
2 “The Italian Job”
According to the Uniform Crime Statistics each year in the U.S. there are around 10,000
bank robberies, representing more than 10 percent of all commercial robberies, with an
average loss of 4,000 dollars (Weisel, 2007). Relative to its size, Italy faces a far greater
problem. Each year there are more bank robberies in Italy than in the rest of Europe put
together: approximately 3,000. Data from the European Banking Federation reveal that
Italy is followed by Canada and Germany, which have around 800 robberies per year, and
by Spain with 500 (Table 1). The U.S., which is not part of the Federation, has more
than 5 times the population of Italy but just 3 times as many bank robberies (Weisel,
2007).
Low probabilities of apprehension, large cash holdings, but also mild sentencing, and
the banks’ fear that more stringent security devices would lead to a loss of clients are
2Nagin (1998) and Cameron (1988) survey the hundreds of papers written on deterrence.
4believed to be the main drivers of Italy’s high number of bank robberies. And the trend
over time is not wholly encouraging. Figure 1 shows the average haul (right axis) and the
number of bank robberies (left axis) between 1990 and 2003. While the average haul went
down, the number of bank robberies went from around 1,500 in the early 90s to almost
double that number 10 years later.
Perceived costs of robbing banks depend on the probability of apprehension and on
the expected sanctions. More than 90 percent of Italian bank robberies end up without
an arrest, while in the U.S. 33 percent of bank robbers are arrested on the same day they
commit the robbery. Moreover, US federal guidelines impose sentences of at least 20 years
(plus 5 years when a weapon is used), while in Italy the sentence length ranges between 3
and 10 years depending on the severity of the crime. The range becomes 4.5 to 20 years
when at least one of the following conditions is satisﬁed (art. 628 of the penal code): a
weapon is used, the robber is masked or he is not alone, violence is used to incapacitate
a victim, the robber belongs to an organized crime association.
The expected costs of robbing a bank are, therefore, considerably lower in the Italy
than in the US. What about the expected beneﬁts? Robbing a bank seems to pay. The
average haul is 20,000 euro (in the US it is approximately 6,000 euro). This leads to
a direct cost for society of more than 57 million euro a year. But the indirect cost is
even larger. A survey of 21,000 retail bank branches representing 65 percent of all Italian
branches shows that in 2006 banks spent an average of 10,700 euro per branch to prevent
bank robberies (a total of more than 300 million euro (OSSIF, 2006)). Each branch spent
an additional 4,900 euro to prevent thefts and 6,300 euro to protect ﬁnancial couriers.
Therefore, the total amount spent by banks in 2006 to prevent thefts and robberies was
more than 700 million euro. This might in part explain why Italian banks charge on
average the largest account management fees in Europe: 90 euro against a European av-
erage of just 14 euro (European Commission, 2007). Moreover, Miller-Burke et al. (1999)
show that in the U.S. most employees have multiple negative health consequences from
experiencing a bank robbery while at work, including anxiety and post-traumatic stress
disorder. This is unlikely to be very diﬀerent in Italy and generates an additional cost.
Despite these frightening numbers, there is, to the best of my knowledge, almost no
empirical research in economics and very little research in criminology that has tried to
study bank robberies using robbery-level data. One reason for this is certainly the lack
of data. Several studies describe in great detail robberies (Cook, 2009, 1990, 1987, 1986,
1985) and bank robberies in particular (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2007, Weisel,
2007, Baumer and Carrington, 1986), but only one study–Hannan (1982)–tries to test
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shortcoming of Hannan (1982) is that the adoption of new security devices depends on
past robberies, which might explain why the author ﬁnds no signiﬁcant eﬀects of the
presence of security devices on robberies.
I have been granted access to a unique data set: the universe of individual bank
robberies perpetrated in Italy between 2005 and 2007. The data are divided into two parts,
robbery-level data and branch-level data, that are merged together. Each year branch
managers are required to update the characteristics of their branch (security devices,
number of employers, etc). Moreover, after each robbery branch managers are required to
ﬁll out a form describing the facts (i.e number of bank robbers, haul, weapons, technique,
etc.). The initial number of robberies is 6,434 but 1,215 are excluded because of missing
information on either the robbery or the characteristics of the branch. Managers also
have to record the exact duration of the robbery in minutes. All bank branches have
surveillance cameras that can be used to reconstruct the exact timing. Nevertheless, there
is evidence of heaping in the duration of the robberies. Figure 2 plots the distribution
and the cumulative distribution of the durations between 1 and 46 minutes. The 46th
minute stands for robberies that last more than 45 minutes. There are 185 of them out of
5,219, or 3.54 percent, while almost 90 percent of robberies last at most 9 minutes. The
spikes at multiples of 5 show the heaping. For example, there are no observations between
30 and 40 minutes other than at 30, 35, and 40 minutes. For three reasons the results
are more reliable when the analysis is restricted to bank robberies that last less than 10
minutes: i) it minimizes measurement error bias that is due to heaping; ii) because 90
percent of robberies last less than 10 minutes and suﬃcient data is needed to estimate
hazard rates; iii) because the model outlined in Section 3, and the assumed smoothness of
the objective function are more likely to apply to shorter robberies. But as a robustness
check all the analysis is also performed using robberies that last up to 30 minutes (after
30 minutes too few observations are left). Since heaping introduces measurement error,
in Section 4.3.4 I address how measurement error biases the estimation.
Table 3 presents the distribution of durations below 30 minutes separated into suc-
cessful (no arrest) and unsuccessful (arrest) robberies. At time 0 the sample starts with
4,972 robberies that last less than 30 minutes. 297 last just one minute. Of these 24 lead
to an arrest and 273 don’t, and are labeled as successful, even if the robbers walk out of
the bank empty-handed. After the ﬁrst minute 4675 robberies are left, of which 71 lead
to an arrest and 1,049 terminate without an arrest, and so on.
The summary statistics in Table 4 show that between 2005 and 2007 only 6.33 percent
6of bank robbers were arrested after robberies that lasted less than 10 minutes.3 The
typical robbery lasts around 3.2 minutes and leads to a haul of approximately 14,000
euro. Given that more than half of all bank robberies involve two or more perpetrators
the average haul per criminal is smaller or equal to approximately 8,000 euros. Only 14
percent of bank robberies involve ﬁrearms, as judges sanction their use with increased
punishments. 43 percent of all bank robbers mask their face when robbing a bank. 21
percent of bank robberies happen in central Italy, 28 percent in the South and the rest
in the North.4 When compared to the distribution in the population of branches, bank
robbers are more likely to choose banks that have on average smaller amounts of cash, or
banks that are located in less populous areas.
The data set is rich with information about the security devices installed in the bank.
I summarize this information by counting the number of diﬀerent devices that each bank
has, and compute how many characteristics these devices have on average for each bank.
For example, 92 percent of the banks have a security entrance but the characteristics
diﬀer widely. Some have metal detectors, some have a double door where people can
be trapped, some have a biometric sensor, etc., while some entrances might display all
these characteristics. Robbed banks tend to have more security devices installed than
the average bank (7.2 versus 6.7), and these devices tend to have more characteristics
per device. The main reason for this is that banks tend to install new devices after they
experience a bank robbery. The majority of these devices are not visible to the criminal
(like automatic banknote distributors, banknote spotters, time-delayers, banknote tracing
devices, vaults, and alarm systems) while 33 percent are clearly visible (like metal detec-
tors, vault’s time-locks, and protected teller’s post). Since visible and invisible devices
might have a diﬀerent impact on the robbery, I will control for the fraction of invisible
devices. The last 4 columns of Table 4 allow a comparison between the summary statis-
tics of robberies that last more or less than the median, which is equal to 3 minutes.
The average duration of robberies is 2.44 minutes for those that last less than 3 minutes
and 4.93 minutes for those the last more than 3 minutes. This diﬀerence translates into
slightly larger probabilities of arrest 6.28 vs. 6.43 percent, but considerably larger hauls,
11,559 versus 18,469 euro. These diﬀerences can in part be explained by diﬀerences in
the modus operandi. Longer robberies are more likely to be operated by teams (75 versus
3Fifty-nine percent of these arrests happen during the bank robbery, while the rest happens afterwards.
All the results are qualitatively similar when I exclude the robberies where the arrests do not happen
immediately.
4The following central regions separate the southern regions from the Northern ones: Lazio, Marche,
Toscana, Molise, and Umbria.
762 percent), and in longer operations robbers are more likely to be using a ﬁrearm (16
versus 12 percent). Given that the modus operandi is likely to inﬂuence not only the du-
ration but also the probability of success and the expected haul, it is important to control
for it when I model the bank robbers’ decision about the duration of the bank robbery.
The other observable characteristics of branches show only minor diﬀerences based on the
duration of the robberies.
The data that were provided by the Italian Banking Association do not contain any
information about the robbers.5 In order to have some information about typical sentences
I also collected judiciary level data on 95 bank robbers that were sentenced to jail in
the judicial district of Turin, a city in Northern Italy (more on this in Section 4.3.1).
Unfortunately the judiciary level data does not provide enough detail about the robberies
to link them to the robbery data.
3 A Continuous Time Version of Becker’s Model of
Crime
Bank robbers face an obvious trade-oﬀ: the longer they stay inside the bank the more
money they are able to collect, but the risk of getting caught goes up as well. In this section
I model this trade-oﬀ in order to identify the criminal’s disutility of jail. Conditional on
having chosen to rob a bank the criminal’s expected utility V (t,a) is a function of the
duration of the bank robbery, and of his own ability a, which, once the robber starts a
robbery, he cannot modify.6
V (t,a) = [1 − P(T < t|a)]E[U[Y (t,a)]] − P(T < t|a)D(a,w)
= [1 − F(t|a)]E[U[Y (t,a)]] − F(t|a)D(a,w), (1)
where P(T < t|a) = F(t|a) represents the probability of apprehension before time t. The
random variable T deﬁnes the two states of the world, arrest T < t and no arrest T ≥ t),
and is inﬂuenced by the ability of the robbers. E[U[Y (t,a)]] is the expected utility from
a haul equal to Y , which also depends on the duration of the robbery.
D(a,w) represents the disutility from jail, which is unobserved to the econometrician
5But it should be noted that such information would come from arrested robbers and thus likely be
biased because of selection.
6The model assumes rational and forward-looking behavior which is more likely to be valid for ex-
perienced robbers. But more than two thirds of sentenced robbers are recidivists, with some level of
experience.
8and depends on the robber’s criminal ability a and on other factors w, like legitimate
earnings, family composition, fear of physical harm, etc. The reason criminal ability
determines the robber’s disutility is that the opportunity cost of ending up in jail raises
with ability.
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where U′ = ∂U
∂t . Notice that allowing robbers to be arrested with some exogenous prob-
ability q, no matter the duration of the bank robbery, means that the expected utility
would be W(t,a,q) = qD+(1−q)V (t,a) and one would still get the same ﬁrst order con-
dition shown in Equation refeq:FOC. Following this, all the results are robust to arrests
that happen independently on t and are not recorded by the Italian Banking Association.
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∗,a)]]. (3)
Thus conditional on ability a the chosen duration of robbers t∗ identiﬁes their disutility
D(a,w). I assume that the utility function is linear U( ) = Y ( ), which implies risk
neutrality. Using this assumption one does not need to specify an initial level of wealth
(Block and Heineke, 1975). Section 4.5 shows how the results change when one departs
from risk neutrality.
There are two main measurement issues related to Equation 3: i) individual expecta-
tions are unobserved, and ii) even if we knew the functional form of the expected utility
and of the hazard rate, the ability would still be unobserved.
There are two ways to measure expectations and ability, and each one has its own
advantages and disadvantages, parametrically and semi-parametrically.
3.1 Parametric Estimates
Experienced robbers of high ability should know how to best perform a bank robbery.
They know which banks are more vulnerable and less risky; they know which weapon
they should use, and whether it pays to work in a group; they understand that using a
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them modus operandi x, are likely to carry a signal about the ability of a robber, or of
a group of robbers. Allowing the ability to minimize risk ar to diﬀer from the ability to
maximize the haul ah these signals can be weighted using a linear function:
ar = x
′βr + ur (4)
ah = x
′βh + uh . (5)
The random variables ui measure the part of the ability that is not captured by x′βi (i =
h,r), or simply some incidents that happen during the bank robbery and are observable
to the robbers but not the econometrician. Let me repeat that robbers choose which bank
to target, and how to carry out the robbery, in other words, x is endogenous. Harding
(1990), for example, interviewing almost 500 robbers ﬁnds that most of them choose
whether to use a gun rationally, considering the beneﬁts (improvement in outcomes) and
costs (increase in sanctions). But x is predetermined once the robbers enter the bank,
and once x is given the bank robber has to choose t∗.
Assuming that i) criminals have expectations that are group-speciﬁc, ii) that there
are no unobservable abilities or unobservable incidents, ui = 0 (i = h,r), the estimates of
λ(t∗|x) and E(U′[Y (t∗,x)]) measure the perceived hazard rate and the perceived marginal
utility of individuals with characteristics x. Estimates of λ(t∗|x), E[U′[Y (t∗,x)]] and
E[U[Y (t∗,x)]] provide the distribution of D(x,w), the disutility of jail, a decisive compo-
nent of criminal behavior. In this setup, based on Equation 5, the characteristics of the
robbers and the banks they decide to target signal their ability. And these signals should
be used to set sentence enhancements that target speciﬁc robbers, as prescribed in Italy’s
art. 628 of the penal code. The precision of the estimates depends on how precisely bank
managers measure the duration of bank robberies t, and Section 4.3.4 deals with this
issue.
What if criminals’ individual expectations diﬀer from the conditional ones, the “grouped”
ones, or ui  = 0 (i = h,r)? In this case one solution would be to use repeated robberies
of individual robbers. Under the strong assumption of no learning across robberies (ﬁxed
unobserved ability and no unobserved incidents), one could diﬀerence out u. In order
to identify robbers one would have to use data from surveillance cameras, which are not
yet available because judicial data would introduce selection bias: later it will be shown
that less able robbers are more likely to be arrested. In Section 4.4 I show that under
some parametric assumptions one can estimate the joint distribution of the two unob-
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thus determine how robust the ﬁndings are when we depart from the assumption of no
unobserved ability ui = 0 (i = h,r). The main intuition is that unobserved heterogeneity
in the expected marginal haul is like a random coeﬃcient on the duration of the bank
robbery. Forcing the coeﬃcients to be constant moves the the random coeﬃcient into
the error term. But unlike the idiosyncratic part of the error term this additional part is
heteroscedastic and depends on time, which identiﬁes its variance.
The other way to control for individual heterogeneity is to base the estimates on actual
realizations. These will contain the individual speciﬁc ability, but also incidents that are
unobserved to both the econometrician and the robbers, leading to overly noisy estimates.
3.2 Semi-parametric Estimates
In the previous section the assumption was that individual expectations that depend on
ability can be approximated expressing the haul (or the utility) and the risk of appre-
hension as a parametric function of the modus operandi. A robber knows his marginal
beneﬁts and marginal costs of staying an additional minute inside the bank even before
entering the bank, and does’t get any additional information about those margins while
in action. While it might be diﬃcult to continuously re-optimize based on what happens
during a robbery, and while it might take time to interpret the signals one gets during a
robbery, the assumption that robbers stick to their initial choice might be too strong.
Over time the robber might get some new information about the speed at which he
is collecting the haul. A way to measure the marginal haul and the total haul, taking
this additional information into account, is to use the actual realization Y to compute
the expected marginal haul E[Y ′(t,a)] and the expected total haul E[Y (t,a)]. Unlike for
the haul, there are no clear signals that change risk perceptions over time. Moreover,
realized risk does not change continuously (one is either apprehended or not), meaning
that one cannot use realizations to approximate perceptions. For this reason one still has
to specify a parametric function to model risk.
The advantage of this semi-parametric method—“semi” because the hazard rate is still
going to be parameterized—is that the actual realization is directly linked to individual
ability a, addressing the concern that in the previous approach t might be correlated with
unobserved ability. Since the individual expectation is equal to the realization plus the
individual forecast error E[Y (t∗,a)] = Y +ξ, the realization is a good approximation of the
expectations, as long as the robber’s forecast error is small. In the parametric approach
these unexpected incidents enter the error term and are averaged out, here, instead, they
11add noise to the distribution of the disutility of jail, leading to an overly heterogeneous
distribution.
But these very diﬀerent and less parametric estimates, shown in Section 4.4, provide
a robustness check for the more parametric ones.
4 Empirical Analysis of Preferences and Strategies
of Bank Robbers
Solving the model of optimal duration for the unobserved part D using a linear utility
(U = Y ), the disutility of incarceration depends on the marginal haul E(Y ′(t)), on the
average haul E(Y (t)), and on the hazard rate of apprehension λ(t). The next step is to
devise an empirical strategy to estimate these functions. Let me start with the average
and the marginal haul.
4.1 The Average and the Marginal Haul
Figure 3 shows a locally smoothed regression with optimal bandwidth of the haul as a
function of time (Cleveland, 1979). The average haul appears to be linear in time, which
is consistent with the typical technology used to rob a bank: i) enter the bank and walk
to the teller, ii) ask the teller for the money, typically the teller’s direct cash holdings,
iii) collect and store the cash. Of all these actions the last is probably the most time
consuming, and is likely to produce constant marginal cash returns with respect to time.
For these reasons I will model the haul using a linear regression, clearly a good approx-
imation of the more ﬂexible conditional mean. Moreover, a liner regression allows me to
estimate group speciﬁc marginal eﬀects without suﬀering from the curse of dimensionality,
typical of more non-parametric methods. Using a linear model and allowing the slope of
the haul with respect to t to depend on x the vector of the modus operandi and of the
branch characteristics, the estimating equation is:








i + ǫi (6)




t∗xxi and b E[Y (t∗
i,xi)] = b yi at once. Notice that the purpose of this equation is to
provide the best approximation to the individual expectation of the haul. Given that the
technology appears to be linear, it is reasonable to assume that robbers have expectations
12about the haul that change linearly with the time as well. But the coeﬃcients on the
regressors cannot be given any causal interpretation. Indeed, as outlined in the model,
they are supposed to capture as much selection on ability as possible. As speciﬁed before,
an alternative way is to measure the expectations using actual realizations (for successful
robbers), b E[Y (t∗
i)] = yi and b E[Y ′(t∗
i)] = yi/t∗
i, where the last equation assumes again a
linear technology.
Table 5 presents the estimates of Eq. 6. Column 1 shows that when I do not control for
any other characteristics of either the bank or the bank robbery, each additional minute
spent robbing a bank is associated with a 1,000 euro increase in the haul but, as we will
see later in the hazard models, it is also associated with an increases in the probability
of apprehension. In column 2 I allow the conditional mean E(Y (t)) but not the marginal
eﬀect E(Y ′(t)) to depend on the characteristics of the bank robbery. Using ﬁrearms is
associated with larger hauls (+4,000 euro), and so is being disguised (+1,400 euro), which
is probably a signal of ability and professionalism. Operating in groups, instead, seems to
be associated with lower the per-capita hauls. In column 3, the same variables that turned
out to be signiﬁcant, are interacted with the duration of the bank robbery, allowing for
diﬀerential slopes.
Bank robberies in South and Central Italy have average hauls that are approximately
1,500 euro larger than in the North. In isolated banks, in smaller banks, that is banks
with less than 5 employees, and in banks with lower amounts of cash hauls tend to be
smaller. Security devices seem to pay oﬀ. Security devices are negatively correlated with
the haul (-248 euro), and so are the average number of characteristic that these security
devices have (-2,500 euro). A higher fraction of invisible security devices is also associated
with smaller expected hauls. Banks that are guarded are subject to lower hauls, but the
diﬀerence is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The slope does depend signiﬁcantly
on ﬁrearms (+1,800 euro), on the average number of characteristics per security device
(-1400 euro), and small cash holdings (-900 euro).
Even with the interactions all slopes stay positive, though having a ﬁrearm seems to
be the only variable that is associated with large increases. Columns 4 and 5 replicate
columns 2 and 3 using the sample of robberies that last up to 30 minutes. Given that
durations that are larger than 10 are more subject to measurement error from heaping (see
Figure 2), it is not surprising that the coeﬃcient on duration becomes smaller. Another
diﬀerence is that adding robberies that last longer the eﬀect of ﬁrearms interacted with
duration becomes smaller while its direct eﬀect becomes larger. All other coeﬃcients
change very little.
13Columns 3 and 5 show the speciﬁcation that I use to predict the haul and the marginal
haul per minute. Notice that column 1 shows an inconsistency.7 Setting all durations
equal to 0, the regression in column 1 predicts an average haul of around 4,400 euro
(the constant term), instead of zero, which is what the model of optimal duration would
predict. But this is not the case when the complete model in column 3 is used, suggesting
that the estimate in column 1 suﬀers from omitted variable bias: unconditionally, more
able robbers take less time to rob a bank. Setting all the durations to zero in the richer
model, that better controls for ability, predicts an average haul of -305 euro, which is not
far from zero.
Given that the estimated disutility of jail is a function of b βt∗ and b βt∗w together with
b λ(t), increasing the number of interactions is going to increase the set of estimated disu-
tilities. In contrast, if all robbers shared the same expected haul, expected marginal haul,
and the same hazard function there would be just one estimated disutility of jail.
4.2 The Hazard Rate of Arrest
But the beneﬁts are only part of the story. Criminals are sometimes arrested, and might
serve prison time. Figure 4 shows the estimated unconditional hazard rate, b λ(t), using the
exponential hazard model and Cox’s proportional hazard model, using the 9 minutes (left
panel) and the 30 minutes (right panel) sample.8 The reason I focus on the exponential
model is to avoid “aiming at a moving target.” If the estimated hazard rates diﬀer across
time, due to selection on ability, it is impossible to pinpoint the criminals’ expected
marginal cost for each additional minute spent inside the bank. Cox’s estimates are
subject to selection, but are shown to compare with the more constrained estimates based
on the exponential model. While I focus on the exponential model and the non-parametric
Cox model, all hazard models lead to similar results.
Table 6 shows how the same regressors that I used for E(Y (t)) inﬂuence λ(t) based
on both the exponential and Cox’s proportional hazard model. In the Cox model the
coeﬃcients do not depend on the baseline hazard, but the results are quite similar when a
constant baseline hazard is used. In the ﬁrst column of each model I control for the charac-
teristics of the robbery, while the last columns additionally control for the characteristics
of the bank. Focusing on the comprehensive regression, criminals who use ﬁrearms are
less likely to get arrested, and so are robbers who work in groups. This is probably be-
7I thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
8In Table 3 and in the hazard models robberies that end without an arrest are treated as censored.
Notice that the purpose is again to get the best predictor of the hazard rate and not to infer causality.
14cause robbers who work in groups are likely to monitor the streets and realize possible
dangers. As before, some of the eﬀects might be driven by selection. For example, the
number of security devices has a puzzling negative eﬀect. This is probably because more
able robbers are more likely to target more “challenging” banks, but are also more likely
to be successful. The geographic region does not inﬂuence the hazard, while smaller and
more isolated banks tend to be less risky. Conditional on the other covariates whether
the bank has a guard or not does not seem to matter. Results based on the 30 minute
sample are very similar to the 9 minute one (Columns 5 to 8).
An exponential hazard model with random unobserved heterogeneity component that
is distributed gamma is rejected by the data in favor of no heterogeneity. This means
that allowing for random eﬀects leaves the coeﬃcients on the modus operandi basically
unchanged. Nevertheless, the unobserved component might still inﬂuence the disutility of
jail and later in Section 4.4 I allow the disutility to contain heterogeneity in ability with
respect to, both, risk and haul.
4.3 Estimating the Disutility of Jail
Based on Eq. 3 estimates of E(Y (t,x)), E(Y ′(t,x)), and λ(t,x) determine the disutility
of jail, D. In particular, using Equation 3 and the exact functional form used to estimate
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where x1i is the subset of regressors that are interacted with the duration of the robbery
to estimate the haul and δi represents the individual marginal haul. Whenever the Cox
hazard model is used the hazard rate depends also on t∗.
Alternatively, when the actual realizations of the haul are used to approximate the











The realized haul is used to measure the expected one, and the average haul per minute is
used to measure the expected marginal one. The robber’s forecast errors might introduce
additional noise, especially if t∗
i is small and is measured with some error (since we are
15dividing by it). It is plausible to think that the robbers enters the bank with some
expectations that are based on his prior experience and that only as time passes he learns
whether his day has been a lucky one or not. In such a learning model the predictions and
thus the estimated disutilities lie in between the parametric and semi-parametric ones. At
the beginning of the robbery criminals’ expectations depend on their initial prior (based
on the parametric model), but as time passes they update their expectations based on the
amount of haul they collect. Assuming that the predicted parametric estimate represents
the robbers’ prediction for the ﬁrst minute, and is later treated as if it was an initial
observation, as time passes, more and more weight (in proportion to time) is added to the




















meaning that the semi-parametric estimate receives a weight of 1/2 after the ﬁrst minute,
2/3 after the second and so on. The estimates of e D and D are later shown in Section
4.4 which is fully devoted to the issue of unobserved ability. In that Section I also show
that under some reasonable assumptions, one can estimate the distribution of unobserved
ability and adjust the disutilities accordingly.
Before displaying the distributions of D, notice that this total disutility is going to
depend on the number of years robbers expect to spend in jail when arrested. It is diﬃcult
to tell how criminals discount jail time, and the data do not allow me to estimate such
a function. The simplest scenario is that robbers do not discount future jail time at all,
and that the total disutility D is simply equal to the yearly times the expected years of
jail time, D = d × S. If robbers discount their future disutility of jail at rate δ, then
D =
PS−1
t=0 δtd = d1−δS
1−δ
In Italy there are no oﬃcial statistics on prison time served by convicted bank robbers.
In order to compute d, the “yearly” disutility of jail, I collected data on sentences related
to bank robberies. The data refer to 96 bank robbers convicted in the Piedmont region.
Because of lack of information about the targeted branches the corresponding 323 bank
robberies, committed between 1993 and 2007, cannot be linked to the robberies outlined
in the previous data.
9These learning algorithms have been shown to be good approximations of more complicated Bayesian
learning algorithms (Cogley and Sargent, 2008).
164.3.1 The Expected Sentence Length
Table 7 shows the summary statistics for the sample of 323 bank robberies attributed
to 96 diﬀerent bank robbers who were sentenced to jail in the Piedmont region, located
in Northern Italy, between 2005 and 2007. This means that in our sample each robber
has been convicted based on an average of 3.4 bank robberies. The bank robbers are on
average 35 years old, most are Italian (92 percent), and despite the convictions coming
from a Northern region, 35 percent were born in the south of Italy. 67 percent of the
robbers are recidivists and 34 percent plea bargain. The other variables vary by robbery.
In 22.5 percent of the cases robbers use ﬁrearms (versus 13.7 percent from the Italian
Banking Association data), in 57.2 percent they wear a mask (versus 42.7 percent) and in
68.9 percent they work in teams (versus 66.3 percent). 4 percent of the time the robber
uses hostages. The average total haul is 12,374 euro, slightly lower than the total haul
based on the banking data. While the modus operandi of robbers that were sentenced in
Piedmont are on average slightly diﬀerent than in the country-wide robbery data of the
Italian Banking Association, the criminal law and, thus, the determinants of the sentence
length should be the same across the country.
The average sentence length is 3.4 years in prison. Data on sentence durations allows
me to model the log-sentence length based on the same modus operandi variables observed
for the bank robberies and to impute the variation in the log-Disutility of jail, D, that
is driven by the variation in the sentence length, S, log(D) = log(d) + log(S). Thus
log(D) − log(S) = log(d) represents the log-Disutility for each year in jail.10
In order to determine the way the modus operandi shapes the expected sentence length,
I estimate the log-sentence length on whether the robber used ﬁrearms, was masked, or
worked in a group. Estimates are shown in Table 8. Based on Column 1, using a ﬁrearm
increases the sentence by approximately 50 percent (by less once I control for recidivism,
hostages, plead bargain, year, total number of robberies committed, total haul). Wearing
a mask and working in groups has a smaller eﬀect on the sentence. Working in groups
increases the sentence length by 20-25 percent, and being masked by less than 10 percent
but without being statistically diﬀerent from zero. Only the use of ﬁrearms leads to
strong and signiﬁcant sentence enhancements. This is likely to explain why so many
robbers choose to work in groups and to wear a mask, while so few use a ﬁrearm.
10Notice that I used a discount factor δ = 1, otherwise log(D) = log(d) + log(1−δ
S
1−δ ).
174.3.2 The Total and the Yearly Disutility of Jail
Figure 5 shows for those criminals who were not arrested, and whose choice of t was more
likely to be the optimally chosen one, the distribution of the parametric total disutility of
jail between the 5th and the 95th percentile. The yearly ﬁgures are estimated dividing the
total disutility by the predicted sentence length based on the regression shown in Column
3 of Table 8. The same distributions but for the sample of robberies that last up to 30
minutes is shown in Figure 6. An interesting feature of all the estimated distributions
is the shape, which resembles an earnings distribution. Since the value of staying out of
jail is likely to depend on the robbers’ earnings potential, it follows that these earnings
are distributed like legitimate earnings. It is worth stressing that nothing in the model
prevents the shape of the distribution from taking any other form or generating negative
“values of freedom.” Indeed, for 10 percent of the robberies the model predicts negative
disutilities of ending up in jail. This is entirely driven by those criminals who rob banks
with a large average number of characteristics per security device. These criminals have
such small marginal hauls that the disutility ends up being negative. These negative
values of freedom can clearly be driven by factors that the model does not control for,
like unobserved heterogeneity in expectations, or heterogeneity in risk aversion. Robbers
that targeted banks with a large average number of characteristics per security device
might have been unable to predict such small marginal hauls. For the 30 minute sample
the coeﬃcient on the average number of characteristics per security device is considerably
closer to zero and only a very small fraction of disutilities are negative. Later, in Section
4.4, I allow the disutilities to depend on unobserved heterogeneity in expectations about
risks and beneﬁts, while in Section 4.5 I allow the utility to be diﬀerent from linear.
The kernel densities show that dividing the total disutility by the expected sentence
length reduces the heterogeneity in disutility. According to Table 9, not only the variance
but also the coeﬃcient of variation gets smaller when controlling for the expected sentence
length. Since expected sentences are likely to be measured with some noise (it is hard to
know what robbers really expect the jail sentence to be), the true expected sentences might
explain an even larger share of the variation. Table 9 also shows that the distribution
is highly right-skewed. As a consequence, the median is small compared to the mean:
44,000 against 71,000 euro for the exponential model with the cutoﬀ at 9 minutes, and
37,000 against 49,000 with the cutoﬀ at 30 minutes. The corresponding ﬁgures for the
yearly disutility are 15,000 and 20,000 euro (12,500 and 14,500 euro for the 30 minutes
sample). These ﬁgures are implicitly assuming that robbers do not discount time. If they
did, the yearly ﬁgures would be relatively larger by logS−log(1−δS
1−δ ), which for an average
18sentence of 3.4 years, would be less than a quarter with a discount factor of 80 percent,
and around 12 percent with a discount factor of 90 percent. Unobserved heterogeneity in
discount rates might thus drive some of the heterogeneity in D.
4.3.3 Disutility of Jail: Ability vs. Deterrence
Robbers with diﬀerent values of freedom target diﬀerent banks, and use diﬀerent modus
operandi. In order to describe this selection, I compute the derivative of the disutility
with respect to the same variables that are related to the haul and to the risk of arrest.
Given that D diﬀers across individuals, so will its derivatives.
Table 10 shows the derivative of logD(t,x) with respect to duration t, and modus
operandi x, which includes the bank characteristics. The Table shows the average deriva-
tive, its standard deviation, and the 5th and 95th percentile.
The sanctioning rules (judges adjust sentences proportionally to the aggravation of
the robbery) suggest to use the log value of freedom instead of the level.11 The observable
characteristics of banks and bank robberies change the (log) value of freedom the way
one would expect, given the sanctioning rules set by the penal code. Art 628 of the penal
code sanctions masked robberies, robberies perpetrated by more than one criminal, and
robberies where ﬁrearms are used more than “simple” robberies (rapina semplice). These
deterrence eﬀects are coherent with the sign of the changes shown in Table 10. The use
of ﬁrearms leads to an increase in the disutility of jail of about 178 percent (the standard
deviation of the change is 63 percent). Using masks and operating in a group also leads to
a sizable and usually signiﬁcant increase in disutility (65 to 80 percent). All these changes
are larger than zero for the top 95 percent of the distribution. But these increases are
considerably larger than the increase in the sentence length that one predicts based on
judiciary level data (Table 8), suggesting that criminals that use ﬁrearms, work in groups,
and mask themselves not only take longer sentences into account, thus increasing the total
disutility, but are also of higher ability. The heterogeneity in ability is clearly visible when
I derive the disutility with respect to variables that do not inﬂuence the sentence length.
Not surprisingly, robbers who operate against banks with little cash holdings are of
substantially lower ability. Those that choose banks with less than 5 employees tend to
be of higher ability, mainly because robberies in smaller banks are clearly less risky. Bank
employees need to be monitored for the duration of the robbery, therefore the greater
the number of employees the riskier the robbery becomes. Security devices, instead,
generate an ambiguous selection. While only the more able criminals select banks with
11Using the disutility of jail in levels gives very similar results.
19more security devices, the same is not true for the average number of characteristics. The
fraction of visible devices and whether the bank has a guard or not do not signiﬁcantly
alter the selection of criminals. But not all of these results are signiﬁcant when using the
standard deviation of the changes to evaluate the signiﬁcance. The model based on the
Cox proportional model gives very similar results.
The last four columns of Table 10 replicate the changes for the sample of robberies
that last up to 30 minutes. Consistent with the diﬀerences shown in the average haul
regressions, the use of ﬁrearms leads to smaller changes (-98 percent). All other changes
tend to be similar.
4.3.4 How Does Measurement Error in Duration Change the Distribution of
D?
While measurement error in the duration is going to have no eﬀect on a constant baseline
hazard estimate, it will bias the estimated marginal haul downwards. Some simulations
that I performed show that while rounding a duration, measured in seconds, to the nearest
or to the smallest minute has almost no eﬀect on the coeﬃcient of duration (chosen to
have the same level of signiﬁcance as in the actual data), rounding the duration randomly
to one of the two nearest minutes induces a larger bias (-13 percent). The largest bias
(-16 percent) arises when 10 percent of the durations are randomly set to be equal to 5











where βi = βt∗t∗
i + β′
t∗xxit∗
i represents the individual slope with respect to t. Since 1 −
t∗
iλ(t∗
i,xi) is generally positive, the bias reduces the estimated D. This can clearly be
seen in Figure 7, where I plot the density of D, assuming three diﬀerent biases: a 5, 10,
and 20 percent attenuation bias of the slope. Dealing with the attenuation bias reduces
the fraction of negative disutilities of jail from 10.3 to 8.8 percent. The median and
the mean are clearly more sensitive to the measurement error. A 10 percent correction
almost doubles the median (from 44,000 to 77,000 euro) and the mean (from 71,000 to
133,000 euro). Adding another 10 percent correction increases the median and the mean
by a relatively smaller amounts (77,000 to 108,000 euro and 133,000 to 195,000 euro).
Similar changes apply to the larger sample of robberies that last up to 30 minutes. It
is interesting to note that the measurement error reduces the diﬀerences between the
distributions estimated using the cutoﬀs of 9 and 30 minutes. Since the sensitivity to the
20measurement error is quite high, the policy simulations of the following subsections are
performed allowing again for diﬀerent degrees of measurement error.
4.3.5 Deterrence and Heterogeneity in Deterrence
The model allows me to answer the following question: How much would policy makers
have to increase the disutility of jail (the sentences) to drive the number of bank rob-
beries to zero? In terms of the model, one needs to determine the level of disutility that
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logD(0,x) − logD(t∗,x) represents the percentage increase in disutility needed for
robbers that use a modus operandi x, in t∗ minutes to drive the duration to 0.12
Given that the only way to increase the disutility of jail is by increasing the expected
jail time, deterrence is going to depend on the robbers’ discount factors. What matters
is how an increase in (relative) jail time translates into an increase in (relative) disu-
tility. If robbers do not discount future jail time than
∂ log(D)
∂ log(S) = 1, while if they do
∂ log(D)
∂ log(S) = −SδS
1−δS logδ. The diﬀerence between these two elasticities measures how discount-
ing attenuates deterrence. With a discount factor of 80 percent attenuation at the average
sentence of 3.4 years is equal to 34 percent, while with a discount factor of 90 percent the
attenuation is equal to 17 percent.
With this in mind, Table 12 shows the distribution of the changes, assuming no dis-
counting. Unlike the distribution of the disutility of jail these elasticities are less sensitive
to measurement error. The 5th percentile shows that without correcting for measurement
error, in order to drive 5 percent of the sample to a duration of zero one needs a 3 percent
increase in the total disutility of jail, or equivalently the same increase in sentence length.
Controlling for measurement error, the change in penalty needed is almost unchanged.
In order to reduce the bank robberies by a quarter, the penalties would have to increase
by between 6 and 9 percent, depending on the degree of the bias. To curb robberies by
one-half, penalties would have to increase by between 11 and 17 percent. In order to
12When the exponential model is used the hazard rate does not depend on t and λ(0|x) = λ(x).
21almost eliminate bank robberies (-95 percent), the sanctions would have to increase by
77 percent in the absence of measurement error and by 48 percent if the measurement
bias was equal to 10 percent. Overall, the estimated model predicts criminal behavior
to be highly responsive to changes in the sanctioning system, though discounting would
attenuate this responsiveness according to the function discussed in the previous para-
graph. Notice also, that given the assumption of risk neutrality, robbers would be equally
responsive to changes in the likelihood of arrest. The lower panel of Table 12 shows that
the responsiveness is even larger when looking at the sample of robberies that last up to
30 minutes.
The data allow us to go even further and explore which robbers are more likely to
respond to an increase in sanctions. Table 13 shows the mean for the modus operandi
variables and for the variables describing the banks for values above and below the median
percentage increase in disutility needed for robbers to drive the duration to 0. Values
below the median signal high responsiveness to sanctions (the corresponding average log
change in disutility is 9 percent), values above the median signal low responsiveness to
sanctions (the corresponding average log change in disutility is 44 percent). A pretty clear
picture emerges from the table, for both samples. Robbers with higher disutilities of jail
(133,000 versus 31,000 euro), more likely professional robbers, are also more responsive
to sanctions. In particular, essentially all robbers that use ﬁrearms belong to the high
responsiveness category. Masked robbers are also considerably more likely to be highly
responsive (64 versus 27 percent). This means that harshening sanctions would mostly
deter those robbers that are responsible for the largest losses. The amateur robbers
would most likely keep on trying to rob banks. It is worth noticing that in the US, where
sanctions are deﬁnitely more severe, bank robberies are believed to be mostly the work
of amateurs (Weisel, 2007, Department of Justice, 2003). A signal of amateurism is that
in the US 80 percent of the incidents involved only one oﬀender (Department of Justice,
2003), against just one third in Italy.
Only in terms of disguises and the use of ﬁrearms do US robbers appear equally or
even more professional. About 40 percent of US bank robbers wear masks (Weisel, 2007),
the same as in Italy. And the use of ﬁrearms in holdups is clearly more widespread in the
US than in Italy, 30 percent against 14 percent, though this might also be driven by their
relative abundance of weapons on the market.
224.4 Unobserved heterogeneity
All the analyses have relied on the assumption that the estimated λ(t∗|x), E[Y ′(t∗,x)] and
E[Y (t∗,x)] capture the robbers perceived cost and beneﬁts. But the regressors x might
not capture the entire ability of robbers. As mentioned earlier, in the absence of repeated
observations one can i) use simulation methods to assess the importance of unobserved
ability, or ii) use actual realizations (which contain all the individual ability plus some
noise). In the ﬁrst method I feed the estimates of λ(t∗|x), E[Y ′(t∗,x)] and E[Y (t∗,x)]
with the unobserved components of ability, the errors ui (i = h,r).
Let us start with the parametric estimates by explicitly allowing Equation 7 to contain
individual heterogeneity. A reasonable and general way to introduce unobserved hetero-
geneity is by allowing the hazard rate and the marginal haul to vary across individuals,
even after conditioning on x. This is like saying that everything else equal, some indi-
viduals expect to gather more money per minute and to risk less for each minute spent
















Notice that   and the βs that measure the marginal haul are now indexed i. Rewriting the
equation in terms of the initial   and β and assuming that the individual heterogeneity


















β and ϕi = eµi/eµ. φi and ϕi represent the individual marginal eﬀects
relative to the average ones. In order to simulate φi and ϕi we need to specify their joint
distribution, which requires several premisses:
No correlation between the observed and the unobserved heterogeneity: If
the unobserved heterogeneity is correlated with the modus operandi x the estimated coef-
ﬁcients would capture such correlation, much in the same way a coeﬃcient that is biased
because of omitted variable bias captures the correlation between the omitted variable
and the dependent variable. For this reason, I assume the unobserved heterogeneity and
the observed one to be uncorrelated with each other, much in the same way in a linear
regression predicted values are orthogonal to predicted error terms.
Shape: Given the shape of the distribution of the disutility of jail it is reasonable
to assume that the joint distribution of φi and ϕi is hump-shaped, meaning that larger
23deviations from the mean are less likely than smaller ones. An obvious and convenient
candidate is the bivariate log-normal distribution. The distribution restrict the individual
relative diﬀerences with respect to the average (φi and ϕi) to be larger than 0.
Mean: Section 4.3.4 discussed the possibility that the marginal eﬀects are system-
atically biased downwards. Here, instead, the marginal eﬀects (marginal haul and the
hazard rate) are assumed to be unbiased, meaning that E(φi) = E(ϕi) = 1.
Variance: The best way to derive the variance of φi is by rewriting the haul regression
with the individual heterogeneity (random coeﬃcients) as








i + ui , (15)
where ui = (φi − 1)(βt∗t∗
i + β′
t∗xx1it∗
i) + ǫi = (φi − 1)δit∗
i + ǫi. ǫi is an idiosyncratic
error term that does not depend on φi, while δi measures, as in Equation 7, the individual











By analogy one can estimate the variance of φ regressing the squared residuals u2
i on










2 + θ + εi . (17)
Notice that this procedure resembles the Breusch and Pagan test for heteroskedasticity
and random coeﬃcient variation (Breusch and Pagan, 1979) with the only diﬀerence that
the evidence of heterogeneity is used to estimate the variance of its unobserved component
σ2
φ = E[(φi − 1)2].
Running a quantile regression that is robust to outliers in the squared residuals of the
haul the estimated variance is equal to 0.46, with a t-statistic of 50. As for the variance of
ϕ, despite Section 4.2’s rejection of a random component to the hazard in one speciﬁcation
I allow ϕi to be random, diﬀerent from φ, but with the same variance.
Correlation: φ and ϕ are likely to be correlated with each other. One would expect
the correlation between ϕ and φ to be negative if the abilities are positively correlated
with each other.
In order to draw φi and ϕi from a joint distribution one needs to know that correlation.
24While one cannot directly measure the correlation between the unobserved components,
the correlation between the observable ones (b λ(t∗
i|xi) and b δi) is easily available. The
correlation is equal to -20.64 percent for the “9 minutes” sample and -20.37 percent for
the “30 minutes” one. Notice that sharing the same regressors does not mean that the two
functions need to be “mechanically” correlated in a particular way. The low correlation
means that minimizing risk sometimes goes against maximizing the money. There can
be trade-oﬀs, like choosing to be partnered by someone that secures the escape on the
outside of the bank: the partner lowers the risk of the robbery but pretends a cut, lowering
the per-capita haul. Unless unobserved signals of ability involve very diﬀerent trade-oﬀs
than the observed ones, one can use the correlation of -20 percent to draw the unobserved
abilities from the joint distribution of φi and ϕi.
For the sake of brevity I perform the following robustness checks on just the robberies
that last up to 9 minutes, but, similar to what happened to all previous analyses, all
the following ﬁndings are robust to extending the sample to robberies that last up to 30
minutes. Figure 8 shows the distribution of φ (the one of ϕ is essentially the same). The
estimated variance of 0.46 translates into considerable unobserved heterogeneity: φs close
to 0 and larger than 2 are quite likely. The upper panel in Figure 9 shows the distribution
of parametric estimate of D with partial (left) and full unobserved heterogeneity (right).
The relative heterogeneity in the hazard rates, even if it is centered around one, tends to
move the distribution to the right. The estimates of D, based on actual realization, are
shown in the lower left panel. A clear advantage of using actual realizations is that they
predict only positive disutilities. But they tend to be larger than the parametric ones, and
with heavy right tails. The reason is that Equation 8 predicts very large marginal hauls
every time a short duration is linked to a large haul. Such outliers were in part averaged
out in the parametric estimates. Since robbers are likely to learn their productivity over
time the lower right panel shows an estimate of D based on the learning model shown in
Equation 9.
Table 14 shows several statistics of the distribution of disutility with and without
unobserved heterogeneity. Allowing for just heterogeneity in φ and not in ϕ keeps the
average disutility almost unchanged but increases the standard deviation by almost 25
percent. Adding the heterogeneity in ϕ moves considerable mass to the tails of the
distribution increasing the mean by 50 percent and the standard deviation by 260 percent!
The reason is that whenever ϕ is close to zero the model predicts very large disutilities
to make up for the relatively short duration of the robberies. The median, instead, is
more robust. The semi-parametric estimates suﬀer from a similar problem. The average
25disutility is equal to 170,000 euro but the median is only 88,000 euro. The learning model
predicts disutilities that are similar to the one obtained using full parametric estimates
with full heterogeneity. But these similarities end when one looks at the responsiveness
to changes in D that are shown in the lower part of Table 14.
The additional parametric heterogeneity in D lowers the estimated responsiveness to
changes in D, especially at the upper part of the distribution of “unresponsiveness.” For
example, while to reduce the number of robberies by 50 percent one needs a 17 percent
increase in D when φ = ϕ = 1 (no unobserved ability), a 21 percent increase when φ  = 1
and ϕ = 1, and again a 16 percent increase when φ  = 1 and ϕ  = 1, reductions of 90
percent demand increases by 77, 127, and 130 percent.13
In the semi-parametric estimates the marginal haul is inversely related to the duration
t∗. This increases the robbers estimated responsiveness to changes in disutilities, especially
for reductions that are above 50 percent (P50). The estimates tend to be too low. For
example, a 6 percent increase in disutility is predicted to lead to a 50 percent reduction
in robberies (9 percent in the learning model). But while the estimated disutilities and
the estimated responsiveness tend to diﬀer based on whether one uses the parametric
or the semi-parametric estimates, Table 15 shows that the robbers’ proﬁle by how they
responsive they are to incentives are the same as before. The most “responsive” robbers
are still those that have higher disutilities of jail o matter how one models unobserved
heterogeneity. And these robbers are more likely to use ﬁrearms, and more likely to work
in a group and disguise their appearance.
On the one hand, the shape of the distribution of disutility and the proﬁle of robbers
that tend to be more responsive to sanctions is reasonably robust to the inclusion of
parametric or semi-parametric unobserved heterogeneity in expectations and ability. On
the other hand, the average disutility and the changes in disutility needed to reduce the
number of robberies tend to diﬀer depending on whether one uses the parametric or the
semi-parametric method.
4.5 Risk Averse, Risk Neutral, or Risk Lover?
Up until now I assumed risk neutrality. There is some evidence using experimental data
that criminals that are in prison are indeed at most risk preferrers Block and Gerety
(1995). Allowing for a constant relative risk parameter, using an isoelastic utility function,
is straightforward if one assumes a given level of initial wealth. I assume an initial level
13Notice that since responsiveness can only be estimated for positive disutilities some diﬀerences are
driven by the diﬀerent sample selections shown in the upper part of Column 1.
26of zero wealth. This is like saying that criminals rob banks every time they really need
the money. Instead of using the haul Yi as the dependent variable I simply assume a
constant relative risk aversion and use Y
1−r
i /(1 − r), where r is the coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion. Table 16 shows the corresponding regression functions. The relative size of
most coeﬃcients is preserved.
As before, the predicted values represent the expected utilities, while the coeﬃcients
on duration represent the marginal utilities. Using the exponential hazard estimates from
before one can compute the disutility of jail for the diﬀerent risk preferences. The distri-
butions are shown in Figure 10. One striking feature is that log utility, that corresponds to
an isoelastic utility with risk aversion parameter of 1, generates a distribution of disutilies
with 80 percent of values being negative (see the ﬁrst column of Table 17). Notice that
adding some initial wealth to the utility would only increase the marginal cost of arrest
and thus increase the fraction of negative disutilities. The distribution of durations with
large risk aversion is clearly rejected by the data. A risk aversion parameter of 0.5 instead
generates a distribution which is not very diﬀerent from the one based on risk neutrality.14
The data would also be consistent with risk loving preferences. Table 17 shows that the
relative changes in utility needed to drive the durations to 0 are generally decreasing in
the risk aversion parameter r. The only exception to this rule is the log utility, but the
exception is driven by the very selected sample of individuals with positive disutilities (20
percent of the total). Overall the distribution of the changes needed to drive durations
to zero do not vary by much, casting doubt on the possibility that heterogeneity in risk
aversion and not in disutilities is the main driver of the diﬀerence in observed durations.
5 Conclusions
During bank robberies both the probability of apprehension and the average haul increase
over time. At the margin this trade-oﬀ depends on: i) the criminal’s expected haul at
time t, ii) its expected increase between t and t+1; iii) the hazard rate of arrest, and
iv) the criminals’ disutility of ending up in jail, which in part depends on deterrence.
Unique data on 5,000 Italian bank robberies – representing 57 percent of all European
bank robberies, with information on the observed duration among successful robberies
allow me to identify and then analyze the individual disutility of jail.
14Estimates that are based on experimental data are typically close close to 0.5, while those estimated
using ﬁnancial data are larger (Gollier, 2004, Kocherlakota, 1996, Holt and Laury, 2002, Dohmen et al.,
2010).
27The vast majority of criminals face relatively low disutilities of jail, while a few face
very high ones. The shape of the distribution resembles the shape of an earnings distri-
bution.
Simulating relative changes in deterrence, suggests that deterrence eﬀects are high,
and that the most responsive robbers to deterrence are the more able ones, those that
have a higher disutility of ending up in jail because their opportunity cost of prison time
is higher.
These criminals tend to rob banks using ﬁrearms, being disguised, and working in
teams. They are also more likely to target the right banks, those with higher cash holdings
but fewer employees. This diﬀerential deterrence potential, coupled with considerably
harsher sanctions (the average prison sentence is 137 months in the US and just 40 months
in Italy), is likely to explain why nowadays, unlike Italian bank robbers, US ones “are
clearly amateurs and not bank robbery specialists.” (Department of Justice, 2003). The
results are robust to the inclusion of unobserved ability and heterogeneity in expectations.
The hypothesis that these robbers have large risk aversion is rejected by the data.
The relatively large number of bank robberies, together with evidence of possibly large
deterrence eﬀects, suggests that in Italy prison sentences might be too low. But it appears
that not the legislator, but rather the judges should reconsider their customs. Actual sen-
tences are often below the minimum ones set by law. And despite well designed sentence
enhancements that penalize modus operandi that are linked to high ability robbers judges,
with the exception of the use of ﬁrearms, tend to neglect them.
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Figure 1: Number of Italian Bank Rob-
beries, Average haul, and of the Number
of Casualties
Notes: This ﬁgure shows the total number of
Italian Bank Robberies (left axis), the average
haul in euro (times 1,000) and of the number of
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Figure 2: The Distribution of Duration t
Notes: The spikes indicate the distribution of
duration (on the left axis) while the dashed line
indicates its cumulative distribution (on the right
axis). Minute 46 stands for all the durations that
lasted more than 45 minutes.
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Notes: The solid line represents the linear regression, the dashed one a locally smoothed regression
(Cleveland, 1979). The left panel shows the regression lines with duration truncated at 9 minutes, the
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Cox proportional hazards regression
Figure 4: The Estimated Hazard Rate
Notes: The Cox proportional hazard is estimated applying an Epanechnikov kernel smooth with
optimal bandwidth on the estimated increments of the cumulative hazards. The left panel shows the
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Figure 5: The Distribution of the Conditional Value of Freedom (t ≤ 9 minutes)
Notes: The upper panels show the distribution of the total disutility of jail, the lower ones the
corresponding yearly ﬁgures assuming a discount factor of one (between the ﬁrst and the 95th
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Figure 6: The Distribution of the Conditional Value of Freedom (t ≤ 30 minutes)
Notes: The upper panels show the distribution of the total disutility of jail, the lower ones the
corresponding yearly ﬁgures assuming a discount factor of one (between the ﬁrst and the 95th









0 −50 0 50 100 150 200 250
x
No correction 5% correction














0 −50 0 50 100 150 200 250
x
No correction 5% correction
10% correction 20% correction
Measurement error
t ≤ 9 minutes t < 30 minutes
Figure 7: The Distribution of the Conditional Value of Freedom Depending on the Mea-
surement Error
Notes: The relative bias correction of size m changes D according to m ∂Di
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Figure 8: The Distribution of Unobserved
Ability
Notes: The ﬁgure shows f(φ) but ϕ is drawn
from the same distribution, and the two
unobserved abilities are negatively correlated
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Figure 9: The Distribution of the Condi-
tional Value of Freedom (t ≤ 9 minutes)
Notes: The upper panels show the distribution of
the total disutility of jail, the lower ones the
corresponding yearly ﬁgures assuming a discount
factor of one (between the ﬁrst and the 95th
percentile). These estimates are based on
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Figure 10: The Distribution of the Conditional Value of Freedom by Risk Preference
Notes: Each plot show the distribution of the total disutility of jail for diﬀerent degrees of risk aversion
(between the ﬁrst and the 95th percentile).
38Table 1: Number of Bank Robberies across the World
Total Robberies R. per Branch (in %) Total Robberies R. per Branch
Andorra 0 0 Japan 133.29 0.98
Australia 119 2.54 Liechtenstein 0 0
Belgium 117.43 1.37 Lithuania 12.29 1.79
Bulgaria 1 0.32 Luxembourg 2.14 0.71
Canada 827.71 14.1 Malta 0.71 0.7
Croatia 27.43 2.45 Monaco 0 0
Cyprus 6.57 0.91 New Zealand 25.14 2.18
Czech Republic 66.29 4.08 Norway 11.86 0.96
Denmark 160.14 7.91 Poland 72.71 0.61
Estonia 1.71 0.69 Portugal 97.29 1.78
Finland 8.71 0.53 Slovak Republic 13.57 1.16
France 639.29 2.28 Slovenia 11.57 1
Germany 837.71 1.96 Spain 523.43 1.36
Greece 143.57 3.68 Sweden 38.86 2
Hungary 33.29 1.03 Switzerland 16.29 0.43
Iceland 2.71 1.66 The Netherlands 77.14 2.41
Ireland 64.57 5.22 Turkey 83.86 1.22
Italy 2770.86 8.67 UK 191.86 1.74
Source: European Banking Federation. “Total Robberies” are the average yearly number of robberies from 2000 to 2006.
39Table 2: Probability of Success and Average Haul (in e) in Diﬀerent Countries
P(success) Av. Haul P(success) Av. Haul
Australia 0.56 14227 Italy 0.9 20183
Belgium 0.57 47434 Japan 0.29 .
Bulgaria 1 12880 Lithuania 0.55 63545
Canada 0.97 3011 Norway 0.5 807
Croatia 0.87 25592 Poland 0.71 5502
Cyprus 1 35548 Portugal 0.89 8643
Czech Republic 0.75 11053 Slovak Republic 0.86 11200
Denmark 0.93 22023 Slovenia 0.7 2591
Estonia 1 4470 Spain 0.92 16065
Finland 0.67 804795 Sweden 0.71 18608
France 0.79 14331 Switzerland 0.65 90065
Germany 0.76 32417 The Netherlands 0.41 60380
Greece 0.89 29307 Turkey 0.73 4848
Hungary 0.5 17003 UK 0.6 32827
Ireland 0.82 8626
Source: European Banking Federation for the year 2006.
40Table 3: “Life table” of bank robberies
Time Number surviving Arrested Successful Total
to time t − 1 between t − 1 and t
1 4972 24 273 297
2 4675 71 1049 1120
3 3555 99 1572 1671
4 1884 31 477 508
5 1376 53 702 755
6 621 4 71 75
7 546 5 50 55
8 491 1 55 56
9 435 0 12 12
10 423 20 169 189
11 234 0 4 4
12 230 0 9 9
13 221 2 9 11
14 210 0 3 3
15 207 7 41 48
16 159 1 4 5
17 154 1 2 3
18 151 5 0 5
19 146 0 4 4
20 142 9 49 58
22 84 0 2 2
23 82 0 3 3
25 79 0 29 29
27 50 0 1 1
28 49 0 1 1
29 48 0 1 1
30 47 3 44 47
Notes: This table shows the distribution of successful and unsuccessful
bank robberies that last at most half an hour.
41Table 4: Summary statistics
Sample Whole duration ≤ median (3 min) duration > median
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Arrested 6.33% 24.35% 6.28% 24.27% 6.43% 24.54%
Duration of the robbery (in minutes) 3.24 1.40 2.44 0.66 4.93 1.01
Total haul 13,778 24,291 11,559 14,959 18,469 36,505
Haul 7,879 11,772 7,025 8,736 9,684 16,294
Firearms 0.14 0.34 0.12 0.33 0.16 0.37
Two robbers 0.52 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.56 0.50
Three or more robbers 0.14 0.35 0.11 0.32 0.19 0.40
Masked robbers 0.43 0.50 0.43 0.50 0.43 0.50
Center Italy 0.21 0.41 0.20 0.40 0.22 0.42
South Italy 0.28 0.45 0.27 0.45 0.30 0.46
Guarded 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.26 0.09 0.28
Isolated branch 0.25 0.43 0.25 0.43 0.25 0.43
Bank with little cash 0.63 0.48 0.62 0.48 0.65 0.48
Bank with less than 5 employees 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.53 0.50
Number of Security Devices 5.62 1.17 5.62 1.16 5.62 1.20
Average Number of Characteristics per 1.26 0.38 1.27 0.39 1.24 0.36
% of invisible devices 0.67 0.16 0.68 0.16 0.66 0.15
N.obs. 4,549 3,088 1,461
Notes: This table shows the summary statistics for the sample of bank robberies that last less than 10 minutes. The last four columns
split the sample depending on whether the duration is above or below 3 minutes.
4
2Table 5: Linear Regressions of the Per-Capita Haul
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Haul
Durations t < 10 minutes t ≤ 30 minutes
Duration of the robbery (in minutes) 1,062.13*** 1,079.91*** 3,151.39*** 741.10*** 1,227.89***
(187.58) (186.81) (843.98) (70.62) (243.24)
Firearms 4,020.51*** -2,040.58 4,195.42*** 3,317.52***
(835.82) (1,752.23) (793.43) (973.17)
Two robbers -2,598.85*** -2,611.24*** -2,496.26*** -2,492.60***
(373.28) (370.23) (388.13) (383.68)
Three or more robbers -3,010.80*** -3,025.82*** -3,225.07*** -3,229.65***
(676.84) (664.33) (668.64) (664.61)
Masked robbers 1,364.66*** 1,304.85*** 1,865.47*** 1,807.49***
(365.44) (368.74) (387.07) (386.61)
Center Italy 1,600.39*** 1,519.19*** 1,647.11*** 1,580.43***
(398.44) (398.24) (413.86) (411.58)
South Italy 1,650.65*** 1,644.49*** 2,302.38*** 2,232.74***
(478.67) (474.08) (523.12) (522.23)
Isolated branch -378.98 -415.72 -323.20 -350.71
(353.66) (352.96) (369.60) (364.26)
Bank with little cash -1,336.68*** 1,446.88 -1,495.81*** -183.54
(425.89) (1,353.89) (450.88) (602.56)
Bank with less than 5 employees -368.96 -381.05 -1,018.54** -1,034.68**
(382.61) (380.81) (411.44) (414.15)
Number of Security Devices -248.98** -285.25** -387.19** -412.80***
(123.36) (123.90) (154.29) (153.66)
Average Number of Characteristics -2,492.52*** 1,620.68 -2,925.49*** -1,828.12***
per Security Device (386.25) (1,046.48) (409.76) (591.49)
% of invisible devices -1,955.32** -2,233.70** -1,911.84* -2,030.25**
(957.68) (969.39) (1,021.55) (1,021.78)
Guarded -345.05 -557.58 -350.92 -350.59




Bank with little cash -879.13* -301.39**
(477.00) (147.01)
Average Number of Characteristics -1,374.38*** -275.43**
per Security Device (356.06) (139.42)
Constant 4,435.89*** yes yes yes yes
(538.55)
Observations 4549 4549 4549 4972 4972
R-squared 0.016 0.058 0.070 0.100 0.103
Notes: The average haul is modeled as a linear function of the duration and of the modus operandi. In
columns 3 the duration of the bank robbery is interacted with all the variables that in a ﬁrst step (not
shown) had a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient. Columns 4 and 5 replicate columns 2 and 3 but using robberies
that last up to 30 minutes and not just 9. Robust standard errors in parentheses: : *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
43Table 6: Hazard Models of Arrest
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
t < 10 minutes t ≤ 30 minutes
Exponential Cox Proportional Exponential Cox Proportional
Firearms -0.38* -0.42** -0.40** -0.44** -0.61*** -0.63*** -0.63*** -0.67***
(0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21) (0.178) (0.177) (0.180) (0.180)
Two robbers -0.48*** -0.47*** -0.55*** -0.54*** -0.59*** -0.57*** -0.65*** -0.64***
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.116) (0.116) (0.118) (0.119)
Three or more robbers -0.42** -0.48** -0.54*** -0.60*** -0.73*** -0.76*** -0.82*** -0.87***
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.163) (0.168) (0.167) (0.172)
Masked robbers -0.63*** -0.65*** -0.61*** -0.64*** -0.58*** -0.59*** -0.56*** -0.57***
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.119) (0.120) (0.120) (0.122)
Center Italy -0.19 -0.19 -0.10 -0.11
(0.17) (0.17) (0.148) (0.150)
South Italy 0.07 0.02 -0.04 -0.07
(0.14) (0.14) (0.129) (0.130)
Isolated branch -0.04 -0.04 -0.13 -0.12
(0.15) (0.15) (0.134) (0.135)
Bank with little cash -0.03 -0.03 0.06 0.06
(0.13) (0.13) (0.111) (0.112)
Bank with less than 5 employees -0.36*** -0.40*** -0.32*** -0.35***
(0.12) (0.12) (0.109) (0.111)
Number of Security Devices -0.11** -0.11** -0.09** -0.08*
(0.05) (0.05) (0.044) (0.044)
Average Number of Characteristics -0.04 0.02 0.07 0.11
per Security Device (0.16) (0.16) (0.139) (0.142)
% of invisible devices -0.11 -0.10 -0.14 -0.14
(0.36) (0.36) (0.330) (0.333)
Guarded 0.12 0.19 0.12 0.16
(0.23) (0.23) (0.214) (0.217)
N.obs. 4,549 4,549 4,549 4,549 4,972 4,972 4,972 4,972
Notes: This table shows the estimated coeﬃcients of an exponential (columns 1-3) and a Cox proportional (columns 4-6) hazard model of arrest.
Robust standard errors in parentheses: : *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
4
4Table 7: Summary statistics from trials related to bank robberies
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Characteristics of bank robbers
Age 35.691 10.194 18 65 94
Foreigner 0.083 0.278 0 1 96
Southern 0.344 0.477 0 1 96
Number of robberies 3.365 3.369 1 15 96
Recidivist 0.667 0.474 0 1 96
Plea bargain 0.344 0.477 0 1 96
Total sentence 3.452 1.647 1.333 12.667 94
Characteristics of robberies
Firearms 0.22 0.415 0 1 323
Masked 0.570 0.496 0 1 323
Group robbery 0.687 0.464 0 1 323
Hostages 0.04 0.197 0 1 323
Total haul 12.417 21.667 0 145 323
Year 2004.898 1.474 1993 2007 322
Notes: These data are based on trials against 95 bank robbers, involved in a
total of 323 bank robberies organized between 1997 and 2007, that were held
in the judicial district of Piedmont.
45Table 8: Determinants of the Sentence Length
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log-Sentence
Firearms 0.50*** 0.36** 0.39*** 0.28***
(0.09) (0.16) (0.10) (0.09)
Masked 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.03
(0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Group robbery 0.25*** 0.14 0.20** 0.09
(0.09) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08)






Total haul 0.00* 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Plea bargain -0.21* -0.27***
(0.12) (0.08)
Year -0.00 -0.01 -0.02
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 316 316 95 94
R-squared 0.331 0.431 0.197 0.361
Notes: These regressions are based on trials against 95 bank robbers,
involved in a total of 323 bank robberies organized between 1997 and 2007,
that were held in the judicial district of Piedmont. Robust standard errors
in parentheses: : *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
46Table 9: Conditional Heterogeneity in D (in 1,000s of e)
% Negative Mean St. Dev. C. Var. P10 P25 P50 P75 P90
Sample with t ≤ 9, N = 4,054
Total disutility
Parametric, exponential 0.103 71.41 93.08 1.30 -0.23 20.18 44.83 87.59 179.09
Parametric, Cox 0.117 66.68 128.51 1.93 -2.40 11.46 32.65 76.00 162.82
Yearly disutility
Parametric, exponential 0.103 20.14 21.28 1.06 -0.08 7.51 15.34 27.72 46.77
Parametric, Cox 0.117 18.75 30.81 1.64 -0.88 4.12 11.27 23.72 46.93
Sample with t ≤ 30, N = 4,370
Total disutility
Parametric, exponential 0.002 49.36 40.81 0.83 13.08 22.87 37.41 63.31 97.49
Parametric, Cox 0.045 47.61 85.00 1.79 4.11 12.56 26.14 53.21 98.72
Yearly disutility
Parametric, exponential 0.002 14.53 9.05 0.62 5.02 8.06 12.50 19.30 26.50
Parametric, Cox 0.045 14.11 21.17 1.50 1.48 4.26 8.61 16.25 29.41
Notes: This table shows the mean, the standard deviation, the compensating variation, and the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th
percentile of the disutility of jail using exponential and Cox proportional hazard rates. The yearly ﬁgures are estimated dividing
the yearly ﬁgures by the predicted sentence length based on the regression shown in Column 3 of Table 8.
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7Table 10: log-Value of Freedom changes
t ≤ 9 t ≤ 30
Average SD P5 P95 Average SD P5 P95
Firearms 1.78 0.63 1.17 2.92 0.98 0.17 0.83 1.25
Two robbers 0.68 0.37 0.49 1.06 0.85 0.28 0.63 1.25
Three or more robbers 0.64 0.28 0.50 0.94 0.99 0.23 0.82 1.38
Masked robbers 0.77 0.22 0.67 0.96 0.69 0.13 0.60 0.90
Central Italy 0.18 0.06 0.16 0.21 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.10
South Italy -0.15 0.18 -0.31 -0.08 -0.04 0.15 -0.17 0.03
Isolated branch 0.07 0.10 0.05 0.12 0.18 0.06 0.14 0.27
Bank with little cash -0.90 0.57 -1.91 -0.27 -0.62 0.25 -1.00 -0.42
Bank with less than 5 employees 0.46 0.21 0.37 0.68 0.47 0.19 0.36 0.73
Number of Security Devices 0.22 0.26 0.12 0.50 0.21 0.23 0.11 0.50
Average Number of Characteristics -0.78 0.26 -1.12 -0.33 -0.42 0.09 -0.56 -0.32
% of invisible devices 0.22 0.19 0.13 0.44 0.26 0.16 0.16 0.50
Guarded -0.14 0.08 -0.16 -0.12 -0.15 0.07 -0.21 -0.13
Notes: This table shows the log-changes in the disutility of jail that correspond to a unitary change in the use of ﬁrearms,
etc, together with the standard deviation, the 5th and the 95th percentile.
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8Table 11: Measurement Error in Duration t and the Disutility D
% Negative Mean St. Dev. C. Var. P10 P25 P50 P75 P90
Sample with t ≤ 9 min., N = 4,054
No correction 0.103 71.41 93.08 1.30 -0.23 20.18 44.83 87.59 179.09
5% correction 0.095 102.44 143.57 1.40 1.52 29.06 62.31 116.44 240.81
10% correction 0.092 133.47 196.39 1.47 3.28 37.64 77.56 144.88 315.67
20% correction 0.088 195.52 304.15 1.56 7.35 54.40 108.67 200.34 445.74
Sample with t ≤ 30 min., N = 4,370
No correction 0.002 49.36 40.81 0.83 13.08 22.87 37.41 63.31 97.49
5% correction 0.001 80.99 95.57 1.18 20.31 32.83 54.57 90.80 152.30
10% correction 0.001 112.63 158.77 1.41 26.34 42.34 70.12 118.73 212.87
20% correction 0.000 175.90 288.42 1.64 38.66 61.05 101.26 171.35 342.47
Notes: This table shows how a 5, 10, and 20 percent correction in the marginal haul due to classical measurement
error in the duration of the bank robbery inﬂuences the estimated disutility of jail D.
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9Table 12: Change in logD that Corresponds to t∗ = 0
Mean St. Dev. P5 P25 P50 P75 P95
Sample with t ≤ 9 min., N = 4,054
No correction 0.27 0.37 0.03 0.09 0.17 0.31 0.77
5% correction 0.22 0.31 0.03 0.08 0.14 0.25 0.59
10% correction 0.19 0.27 0.03 0.07 0.13 0.21 0.48
20% correction 0.15 0.20 0.03 0.06 0.11 0.18 0.38
Sample with t ≤ 30 min., N = 4,370
No correction 0.15 0.18 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.18 0.45
5% correction 0.12 0.13 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.14 0.33
10% correction 0.11 0.11 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.13 0.28
20% correction 0.10 0.11 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.11 0.24
Notes: This table shows the mean, the standard deviation, and the 5th, 25th,
50th, 75th, and 95th percentile of ∆logD that is needed to drive the optimal
duration of the bank robbery to 0.
Table 13: High and Low Responsiveness
Average characteristic
t ≤ 9 min. t ≤ 30 min.
Responsiveness high low high low
∆logD 0.09 0.44 0.06 0.25
Disutility 133.22 31.08 69.95 28.99
Firearms 0.31 0.00 0.25 0.07
Two robbers 0.58 0.48 0.62 0.43
Three or more robbers 0.16 0.12 0.19 0.13
Masked robbers 0.64 0.27 0.64 0.26
Central Italy 0.28 0.17 0.26 0.16
South Italy 0.22 0.31 0.26 0.31
Isolated branch 0.26 0.25 0.28 0.21
Bank with little cash 0.49 0.74 0.54 0.72
Bank with less than 5 employees 0.51 0.52 0.54 0.49
Number of Security Devices 5.75 5.59 5.76 5.51
Average Number of Characteristics 1.13 1.22 1.20 1.32
% of invisible devices 0.70 0.66 0.69 0.66
Guarded 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.07
Notes: This table shows the average X’s according to whether the ∆logD needed to
drive the optimal duration of the bank robbery to 0 is above or below the median. A
lower change corresponds to a higher responsiveness.
50Table 14: Unobserved Ability and the Disutility D
% Negative Mean St. Dev. P10 P25 P50 P75 P90
Disutilities D
φ = ϕ = 1 0.103 71.41 93.08 -16.16 20.18 44.83 87.59 274.15
φ ∼ logN( , ),ϕ = 1 0.131 66.72 118.38 -13.64 9.78 31.95 78.47 264.13
φ,ϕ ∼ logN( , ) 0.152 115.69 304.97 -14.78 8.89 39.17 115.66 466.80
Semi-parametric 0.000 170.76 314.05 0.00 34.65 88.28 192.81 577.62
Learning 0.033 121.11 186.81 3.49 32.07 70.53 143.53 383.55
Change in logD that Corresponds to t∗ = 0
φ = ϕ = 1 - 0.27 0.37 0.03 0.09 0.17 0.31 0.77
φ ∼ logN( , ),ϕ = 1 - 0.38 0.52 0.03 0.09 0.21 0.45 1.27
φ,ϕ ∼ logN( , ) - 0.34 0.54 0.02 0.06 0.16 0.40 1.30
Semi-parametric - 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.15
Learning - 0.14 0.22 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.16 0.39
Notes: This table shows the mean, the standard deviation, and the 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 95th percentile of the
disutility of jail as well as of ∆logD that is needed to drive the optimal duration of the bank robbery to 0 when
unobserved heterogeneity is added to the estimation. The estimates allow for unobserved ability in the marginal
haul and in the hazard. The ﬁrst column shows the fraction of disutilities that are negative.
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1Table 15: High and Low Responsiveness
Average characteristic
φ ∼ logN( , ) Semi-parametric Learning
Responsiveness high low high low high low
∆logD 0.12 0.58 0.04 0.10 0.06 0.23
Disutility 139.68 26.29 274.58 94.90 205.79 46.47
Firearms 0.28 0.04 0.19 0.08 0.25 0.04
Two robbers 0.56 0.53 0.62 0.45 0.60 0.47
Three or more robbers 0.17 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.16 0.13
Masked robbers 0.59 0.35 0.70 0.17 0.69 0.20
Central Italy 0.27 0.19 0.29 0.14 0.30 0.13
South Italy 0.23 0.30 0.23 0.32 0.24 0.32
Isolated branch 0.27 0.24 0.29 0.22 0.28 0.22
Bank with little cash 0.54 0.68 0.65 0.60 0.60 0.66
Bank with less than 5 employees 0.50 0.52 0.58 0.45 0.54 0.48
Number of Security Devices 5.70 5.65 5.75 5.48 5.73 5.55
Average Number of Characteristics 1.14 1.20 1.26 1.26 1.18 1.29
% of invisible devices 0.69 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.67
Guarded 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08
Notes: This table shows the average X’s according to whether the ∆logD needed to drive the optimal
duration of the bank robbery to 0 is above or below the median. A lower change corresponds to a higher
responsiveness.
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2Table 16: Expected Utilities With Diﬀerent Risk Preferences
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Haul
Utility: Log r = −1/2 r = 1/2 r = −3/4
Duration of the robbery (in minutes) 0.26*** 24.52*** 63.97*** 1,023.87**
(0.05) (4.62) (23.49) (413.84)
Firearms 0.08 -7.47 -62.78 -1,104.58
(0.14) (12.97) (40.40) (687.16)
Two robbers -0.36*** -24.41*** -33.48*** -415.03***
(0.04) (3.13) (7.43) (118.12)
Three or more robbers -0.42*** -29.30*** -36.09** -402.92
(0.06) (4.80) (16.82) (298.81)
Masked robbers 0.17*** 11.44*** 17.86** 222.44
(0.04) (2.85) (8.64) (148.93)
Center Italy 0.16*** 14.00*** 18.98*** 219.35**
(0.05) (3.62) (7.03) (106.35)
South Italy 0.08 6.33* 38.13*** 610.40***
(0.05) (3.53) (11.28) (193.48)
Isolated branch -0.01 -0.92 -7.92 -109.47
(0.04) (3.06) (7.23) (118.38)
Bank with little cash 0.12 7.16 46.33 865.61
(0.10) (8.30) (35.98) (627.80)
Bank with less than 5 employees -0.19*** -6.37** 0.62 53.50
(0.04) (2.90) (9.01) (155.52)
Number of Security Devices -0.05*** -3.42*** -3.19 -37.92
(0.02) (1.20) (2.17) (33.15)
Average Number of Characteristics -0.05 0.53 52.50** 917.49**
per Security Device (0.12) (8.29) (25.49) (436.09)
% of invisible devices -0.64*** -42.11*** -10.55 -31.51
(0.12) (8.65) (19.02) (302.25)
Guarded -0.22*** -16.32*** -0.24 4.71
(0.08) (5.89) (18.36) (309.44)
Interaction
Firearms 0.06 9.09** 42.68** 696.34**
(0.04) (4.12) (17.16) (300.17)
Bank with little cash -0.07** -6.27** -22.33* -394.98*
(0.03) (2.61) (13.17) (232.61)
Average Number of Characteristics -0.11*** -9.27*** -28.86*** -461.04***
per Security Device (0.03) (2.57) (9.19) (160.42)
Observations 4155 4549 4549 4549
R-squared 0.067 0.075 0.050 0.042
Notes: The utility is modeled as a linear function of the duration and of the modus operandi. Column 1
assumes a logarithmic utility of the per-capita haul, column 2, 3, and 4 a constant relative risk aversion
utility with risk aversion parameter 1/2, -1/2 (risk loving), and -3/4 (very risk loving) parameter. The
“risk loving” utilities are divided by 10,000. All the columns use the same regressors as column 3 in
Table 5. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
53Table 17: Change in logD that Corresponds to t∗ = 0
Negative D Mean St. Dev. P5 P25 P50 P75 P95
Log utility 0.714 0.41 0.52 0.05 0.11 0.22 0.50 1.25
CRRA, r = 1/2 0.078 0.27 0.36 0.04 0.09 0.16 0.30 0.81
Linear utility 0.096 0.27 0.37 0.03 0.09 0.17 0.31 0.77
CRRA, r = −1/2 0.128 0.31 0.47 0.03 0.09 0.19 0.35 0.94
CRRA, r = −3/4 0.142 0.33 0.43 0.03 0.09 0.21 0.39 1.08
Notes: This table shows the mean, the standard deviation, and the 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 95th
percentile of ∆logD that is needed to drive the optimal duration of the bank robbery to 0.
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